































As they are employee associations, it is typically presumed that works councils
redistribute economic rents from rm owners to workers. And indeed, empirical
literature suggests that works councils reduce prots although, at the same time,
they increase productivity. Studies on the protability eect of works councils,
however, mainly use self-reported subjective prot evaluations of managers as the
dependent variable. I additionally use objective measures to check the validity
of these results. While negative eects are reproduced with the subjective mea-
sure, non-negative eects for the objective measures contradict previous results.
With the objective measures, the works council eect on prot further increases
if attempts are made to control for self-selection, and it is generally positive if
the establishment is covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Further results
indicate that the subjective prot measure is a poor measure of actual prots and
that it is hardly appropriate as a dependent variable in a prot regression.
Keywords: worker participation, works council, prot, rent distribution
JEL Classication: J53
1 Introduction
Mandatory works councils are widely considered as employers' costly con-
cessions to workers and to the society's political left wing. And indeed, if
one assumes perfect markets, a legislation that creates powerful and manda-
tory works councils must cause eciency losses and, ceteris paribus, reduce
prots. Additionally, as works councils represent workers, it seems to be
plausible to presume rent-seeking behavior and, as a result, a redistribution
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of economic rents from capital owners to workers, which implies a further
reduction in prots.
In contrast to this view, recent empirical studies suggest that German
works councils have a non-negative impact on establishment productivity
(e.g. Addison et al. (2004), Mueller (2009)). This opens up four possibilities
for the councils' eect on prots. First, if councils nevertheless reduce prots
then they redistribute more than the additional rents they have created.
Second, councils may conne themselves to redistribute only the additional
rents and, thus, leave prots unaected. Third, they do not inuence the
income shares of capital and labor and are therefore positively related to
establishment prots. Fourth, if they are unable to increase wages as strongly
as they increase productivity (both in percentages), labor's share shrinks
while prots absolutely increase.
Empirical studies support the rst possibility and nd a negative associa-
tion of works councils and establishments' prots (e.g., Addison and Wagner
(1997), Addison et al. (2001)). Hence, in Germany works councils appear as
eciency-increasing institutions that redistribute economic rents from cap-
ital owners to workers. This result is in line with theoretical predictions
(Freeman and Lazear (1995)) and explains why powerful works councils do
not evolve without a legal mandate.
While the productivity impact of works councils is examined frequently,
the literature on its protability eects is comparatively sparse and dated.
Moreover, studies use very dierent concepts of protability. The majority
uses self-reported subjective evaluations of current prots by the establish-
ments' managers and nds negative council eects (e.g., Addison et al. (2001),
Dilger (2002; 2003)). Others construct objective measures from value added
and costs (H ubler and Jirjahn (2001)) and some use accounting information
(Addison and Wagner (1997)). An establishment's work force decides on the
existence or non-existence of a works council. Only few studies address the
endogeneity of works council existence (Addison and Wagner (1997), H ubler
and Jirjahn (2001)), which may arise from this self-selection mechanism.
In order to obtain a more comprehensive and up to date picture of the
councils' impact on prots, I construct several prot measures from the
LIAB1 and use data on medium-sized establishments from manufacturing
and service sectors for the years 1996 to 2006. I estimate the direction of po-
tential endogeneity biases and add the establishment's capital stock as an ex-
planatory variable. As the extent of rent-seeking and productivity-enhancing
activities of works councils is likely to depend on whether wages are deter-
1 The Linked Employer-Employee panel data set of the Institute for Employment Re-
search (IAB) in Nuremberg.2 Institutional Background 3
mined inside or outside the establishment (see Freeman and Lazear (1995) or
H ubler and Jirjahn (2003)), it is explicitly controlled for whether the coun-
cil's eect changes if the establishment is also covered by an industry-wide
collective wage bargaining agreement.
The results vary with the protability concept used. While councils' im-
pact on the managers' evaluation of the current prot situation is negative (as
reported in previous studies), utilizing objective prot measures yields more
positive results. Works councils do not inuence whether there is an actual
(objective) prot or a loss. They are positively associated with the estab-
lishments' quasi rents, i.e. with the dierence between value added and labor
costs. For both objective measures, the presence of a collective bargaining
agreement positively inuences the impact of works councils on establish-
ment prots. Furthermore, the results for the objective measures become
more positive if potentially endogenous council existence is controlled for. I
present evidence that the subjective prot measure is not a reliable proxy for
actual prots and conclude that works council existence is unrelated to prots
in case of no collective wage bargaining and positively related otherwise.
Given higher wages in council establishments (as, for instance, reported
in Addison et al. (2001) and Addison et al. (2009)), the positive results for
the objective measure indicate that additional rents due to the councils' pro-
ductivity gains are shared by rm owners and workers. The opposing results
from the subjective prot measure could reect managers' dissatisfaction
with works council existence and not works councils' eect on actual prots.
2 Institutional Background
The Works Constitution Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) is the legal base
for German works councils. It codies the rules for council elections and
regulates the rights of the council. A works council is a board of workers
who are elected by their colleagues for a period of four years. Councils can
be elected in establishments with ve or more permanent employees of which
at least three have to be eligible for election. A worker is eligible for election
if she is with the company for at least six months. Firms that have more than
one establishment, additionally have central works councils which consist of
members of establishment-level councils.2
German works councils are mandatory because workers have the legal
right to establish councils. However, councils do not exist automatically but
depend on the initiative of the employees. As the number of employees rises,
2 For a more in depth treatment of Germany's works council legislation see, for instance,
M uller-Jentsch (1995).3 Theory and Literature 4
the probability of works council existence increases. There are only few small
businesses that have a council, while nearly each establishment with more
than 300 employees has one.
In general, councils have information rights, consultations rights, veto
rights, and co-determination rights. With respect to remuneration, the
Works Constitution Act gives councils co-determination rights in the in-
troduction of new payment methods, the regulation of overtime, changes
of pay groups and transfers. Additionally, councils may use their veto and
co-determination rights in other areas to enforce higher remuneration.
Works councils have no right to organize strikes and the exclusive right
of industry-wide collective bargaining remains with unions. Hence, the Ger-
man system of industrial relations consists of two parts. While unions op-
erate at the industry level, works councils represent all workers in a specic
plant or establishment, regardless whether they are union members or not
or whether their establishment is covered by collective bargaining. Although
works councils and unions are formally independent, both are closely linked in
reality: most works councillors are union members and often actively recruit
new union members while unions devote expertise and nancial resources to
councils (Behrens (2009)).
3 Theory and Literature
Freeman and Lazear (1995) developed a useful framework to model works
councils' eects on prots. They assume that the economic rent (R) gener-
ated by an organization depends an the rights (x) attributed to the workers.
They further assume that R(x) has an inverted U-Shape. This means that
some power in the hands of workers increase total rents but too much power
decreases it. The parameter  with 0 <  < 1 is the share in (R) that is
given to the workers and 1    is the share of the rm owners. Workers are
supposed to use increasing power to achieve a higher share in total revenue,
i.e. 0(x) > 0. Hence, whether prots increase or decrease depends on how
strongly R(x) increases (due to increased productivity) and on how strongly
rm owners' share in rents decreases.
As the number of council rights (x) is determined by law, (x) can only
take two values: (1) in case of council presence and (0) in the other case.3
3 For simplicity I neglect the fact that council rights rise with the number of employ-
ees. As I will only consider establishments with more 20 and less than 300 workers, the
dierence in rights is moderate and this may justify the simplication. Further, the major
dierence in workers' rights depends on the existence or non-existence of a council and
not on employment thresholds. Addison et al. (2001) provide information on employment
thresholds and council rights.3 Theory and Literature 5
If (1) = (0) councils do not redistribute economic rents and increased
prots are shared by workers and rm owners according to (0). As German
works councils may have some rent-seeking power, (1) > (0) is assumed
by most researchers.4
According to Freeman and Lazear (1995) and empirically supported by
H ubler and Jirjahn (2003), collective bargaining outside the establishment
{ e.g., at the industry level { reduces councils' rent-seeking opportunities.
Consequently, (1)   (0) is expected to be smaller for establishments that
are covered by such an agreement. H ubler and Jirjahn (2003) and other
studies further show that collective bargaining raises R0(x), i.e. increases the
productivity eect of councils. Both eects of collective agreements point
into the same direction and hence, as a rst hypothesis, I expect the works
councils' eect on prots to be more positive in the presence of collective
bargaining.
A second testable hypothesis refers to the potential endogeneity of works
councils due to self-selection. Self-selection exists because the workers have
the right to establish a council. Workers will do this if the utility they
gain from having the council exceeds the costs they face. If there are unob-
served factors that inuence both workers' utility and establishments' prots,
works councils are endogenous and the estimated council coecient is biased.
Jirjahn (2009) nds that works councils are introduced for rent-protection
purposes in times of poor establishment performance, and Mueller (2009)
draws a similar conclusion. Hence, as a second hypothesis, it is expected
that correcting for self-selection leads to more positive council coecients.
Previous studies using a self-reported subjective evaluation of protability
as the dependent variable (e.g., Addison and Wagner (1997), Addison et
al. (2001), Dilger (2002; 2003)) nd a negative relationship between works
councils and prots. As the council coecient in Addison and Wagner (1997)
becomes more positive when the works council dummy is instrumented, this
result supports my second hypothesis. However, an obvious drawback of the
subjective prot measure is its dependence on some unknown reference point
of the respondent. I will argue that this measure is not a good measure for
actual prots and present evidence for this view at the end of this paper.
H ubler and Jirjahn (2001) compute an objective prot measure by taking
the dierence between value added and labor costs as the dependent variable.
They nd that works council existence is not associated with this so called
`quasi rent'. Their results seem to support my rst hypothesis but give mixed
results with respect to the second one.
4 Addison et al. (2001) and Addison et al. (2009) nd higher wages in establishments
with a works council.4 Data and Descriptive Evidence 6
Although capital stock is a potentially important omitted variable in all
studies mentioned, its omission may be most problematic in H ubler and
Jirjahn (2001) because the quasi rent quanties the income of rm owners
and foreign capital lenders jointly.5 Hence, if capital is not controlled for, the
council parameter estimates the councils' eect on the sum of rm owners'
and capital lenders' income and not the desired eect on rm owners' prots.
To purge the drawbacks of the approach by H ubler and Jirjahn (2001), I
approximate capital stock following the method proposed by Mueller (2008)
and use it as a control variable. Much more observations than in any exist-
ing study are used, attempts are made to control for the self-selection into
the observed council regime, and the interaction with collective bargaining
is taken into account. Additionally, I run regressions that are based on the
self-reported measure (the same as used by the aforementioned studies) and
on two objective prot measures, respectively. In order to discuss the appro-
priateness of the three measures, I compare the plausibility of their results.
4 Data and Descriptive Evidence
This analysis is based on twelve annual waves (1996{2007) of the Linked
Employer Employee Panel data set (LIAB) of the Institute for Employment
Research (IAB). The survey unit is the establishment or local production
unit, rather than the legal and commercial entity of the company. Informa-
tion on employees is provided for June 30 each year.
As works councils in establishments with less than 21 employees have few
legal rights and because very small establishments may operate systemat-
ically dierent from larger ones, I exclude them from the sample. Nearly
all establishments with more the 300 workers have a works council. To not
estimate unobservable size eects instead of works council eects, those es-
tablishments are also excluded. Furthermore, only prot-oriented manufac-
turing and service sectors are considered.6 I exclude the real estate sector,
because capital stock is the predominant input factor in that sector and is
dicult to interpret there. As value added, capital stock, and other vari-
ables have a dierent meaning in banks and insurance companies than in
other sectors, these two sectors are also dropped, and I end up with 6,500
establishment-year observations.
5 There are studies with direct information on prots and capital stock (see Addison
et al. (1993); FitzRoy and Kraft (1985)). However, these studies are based on very small
samples.
6 This leads to the exclusion of the following industries: health and social work, sports,
culture, entertainment, educational services, sewage, refuse disposal, sanitation, and the
unspecied group of \other services".4 Data and Descriptive Evidence 7
I estimate regressions in which the dependent variable is a self-reported
ordinal prot measure: establishments are asked to classify their prot sit-
uation into the categories `very good', `good', `satisfying', `sucient', and
`insucient'. This is transformed into a binary variable that is one if the
establishment is at least in a good prot situation (35.8 percent of obser-
vations) and zero otherwise. Note that the respondents are not asked to
compare the prot situation of their rm to the prot situation of rms of
similar size, region, or industry.
The dierence between value added and labor costs in 1,000 Euros, di-
vided by the number of workers is used as an objective prot measure. Fol-
lowing H ubler and Jirjahn (2001), the dierence is called the quasi rent.
Value added is total sales minus the costs of intermediate goods and services
bought to produce output. Labor costs consist of gross wages and non-wage
labor costs. Non-wage labor costs contain employers' compulsory contribu-
tions to the social security insurance system and accident insurance as well
as other costs that may dier by establishments and sectors. As the data
contain no information on non-wage labor costs, the latter has to be ap-
proximated. I used information about gross income per worker and total
labor costs per worker by sector from the national accounts (see Statistis-
ches Bundesamt (2008)) in order to compute the average non-wage cost as a
percentage of gross income per worker. This percentage is then added to the
LIAB information on gross wages to approximate total labor costs.
As an additional objective measure, the 2007 wave of the panel contains
information on whether the establishment experienced a prot, a loss, or a
balanced result in the year 2006. Prot is here dened as revenue minus
costs which is the pre-tax prot. However, it is not explicitly asked for pre-
tax prots. The variable is recoded as a binary variable. As more than 80
percent of the establishments report a prot, the variable is 1 if there is a
prot and 0 otherwise.
One drawback of this measure, compared to the quasi rent, may arise
from the imprecise survey question. If respondents view taxes as costs and
therefore report after-tax prots, the objective binary measure is only loosely
related to actual prots since establishments optimize their tax burden over
time. If the optimizing behavior is randomly distributed over establishments
and time, the binary objective prot measure is a noisy but still unbiased
measure of actual prots in the year 2006. By contrast, if tax optimization
is not randomly distributed over establishments and time, then some estab-
lishments, for example the establishments with a works council, may move
tax burdens to other periods and report lower prots in 2006 than they actu-
ally had. In this example, the estimated council coecient would be biased
downwards.4 Data and Descriptive Evidence 8
The prot variables are regressed on a works council dummy and a set
of control variables as described in Table 7. Capital stock is approximated
using the approach proposed by Mueller (2008). The collective bargaining
dummy is 1 if the establishment is covered by an industry-wide collective
bargaining agreement or an establishment-level collective agreement which
is negotiated between a single employer and an industry-wide union and 0
otherwise.
In order to provide a rst grasp of the relationship between R(1) R(0),
(1)   (0),7 and collective wage bargaining agreements, in Table 1 total
factor productivity (TFP) and labor's share in value added are compared by
collective bargaining agreement for establishments with and without a works
council. TFP is calculated for the whole sample of approximately 6,500
establishment-year observations from OLS regression of log value added on
the full set of regressors in Table 7 omitting the variables works council and
bargain. From this regression, log value added is predicted for the establish-
ments in each group of Table 1, respectively, and subtracted from observed log
value added. Hence, TFP estimates the percentage advantage/disadvantage
in productivity of the average establishment in the respective group, com-
pared to the average establishment in the sample. Labor's share is the total
wage bill (including non-wage labor costs as described in Section 4) divided
by value added.
TFP of group I establishments, i.e. of establishments with both a works
council and collective bargaining, is 6.8 percent higher than that of the aver-
age establishment in the sample while TFP in group II, where establishments
have a collective agreement but no works council, is 7.8 percent lower than
in the average establishment. R(1)   R(0) is positive and highest in group
I. As labor's share is lowest in that group, establishments that have both a
works council and are covered by collective wage bargaining are expected to
have the highest prots.
Comparing TFP and labor's share between the two groups without col-
lective bargaining (i.e. cells III and IV) yields the results that one would
expect from the Freeman and Lazear (1995) model and previous empirical
studies: while TFP is somewhat higher in case of council existence, labor's
share is also higher. This indicates some rent-seeking behavior of councils
but leaves open the sign of the protability eect.
Comparing labor's share between the two groups with collective bargain-
ing gives (1)   (0) < 0, which indicates redistribution of economic rents
towards rm owners. This does, of course, not mean that wages are abso-
lutely lower in the council group { it reects that the percentage increase
7 R(x) and (x) are introduced in Section 3.4 Data and Descriptive Evidence 9
Tab. 1: Total Factor Productivity and Labor's Share





















Notes: Total factor productivity (TFP) and labor's share in percentages.
TFP measures the productivity dierence of the average establishment in the
respective group to the average establishment in the sample. It is calculated
from OLS regression of log value added on the full set of regressors in Table 7
omitting the variables works council and bargain (PDImin and PDImax are
also excluded because they are not observed each year). From this regression,
log value added is predicted for the establishments in each group, respectively
and subtracted from observed log value added. Labor's share is the total
wage bill (including non-wage labor costs as described in Section 4) divided
by value added.
in productivity dominates the increase in wages. Consequently, in case of
collective agreements, if total wage costs in council establishments are higher
by some percentage, than this percentage is lower than the relative pro-
ductivity advantage of council establishments. Presumably, this is the case
because wages are to a considerable extent exogenously determined at the
industry level and are therefore not fully adjusted to productivity changes
within a group of establishments in that industry that is covered by such an
agreement (i.e. the council establishments). Assuming that workers cannot
inuence whether they are covered by such an agreement and because other
rms with similar productivity in that industry are also covered by a collec-
tive agreement, workers have few or no higher-wage outside options, and a
stable situation with wages below productivity is possible.8
The descriptive evidence in Table 1 indicates that, in case of collective
bargaining, the amount of rights given to the workers by the German works
council legislation leads to a situation where both productivity and prots
8 As Freeman and Lazear (1995) implicitly assume that a rise in labor productivity
translates into an equivalent rise in wages, the situation (1)   (0) < 0 is not considered
in their model. In the absence of a collective agreement, the gures in Table 1 do not
conict with their assumption of (1)   (0) > 0.5 Methods 10
are higher than in the situation without councils. This supports my rst
hypothesis from Section 3 and challenges the hypothesis of works councils'
rent-seeking, redistributive, and prot-decreasing nature. As the latter hy-
pothesis is conrmed by previous studies that are based on the subjective
prot measure, the results in Table 1 also call the appropriateness of this
measure into question.
5 Methods
The model to estimate is
profiti =  + Wi + Xi + i (1)
where profit is a prot measure, W is a dummy indicating works coun-
cil presence,  is the parameter of interest, X is a vector with the control
variables described in Table 7 and  is an error term.9
The parameter  cannot be consistently estimated with ordinary least
squares techniques (OLS) if Wi is correlated with i. This is the case if
unobserved mechanisms inuence both the probability of works council ex-
istence and the prot measure. A correlation between Wi and i exists if
the workers' decision to erect or maintain a works council depends on the
prot situation. It is assumed that workers erect or maintain a council if the
(latent) utility they obtain from doing so (i.e. the dierence between ben-
ets and costs) is greater than zero. The latent utility for the workers in
establishment i, W 
i , can be described as
W

i = Zi + ui (2)
where Zi contains the regressors Xi from equation (1) and, not necessarily,
external instruments,  is the corresponding coecient vector and ui is a
random error. The observed works council regimes W are
W = 1 if W
 > 0
W = 0 if W
  0:
A model where agents endogenously choose the regime (W = 1 or W = 0)
is an endogenous switching regression model. Endogenous switching regres-
sion models can be estimated consistently employing the logic of the Heckman
9 I do not exploit the panel character of the data because the works council dummy is
nearly time-invariant and xed eects estimators would therefore yield imprecise estimates
of . However, xed eects results and a solution to the time-invariance problem are
presented at the end of this section.5 Methods 11
Two Step estimator (see Heckman (1979)). The basic idea in the Heckman
Two Step estimator is to add the inverse Mills Ratio as a regressor in the
prot equation in order to control for selectivity. However, as endogenous
switching regression models estimate one prot regression for establishments
with a council and one prot regression for establishments without a coun-
cil, no council parameter will be estimated. In this situation, an estimate
of the council's eect on prots can be obtained from an Oaxaca-Blinder
decomposition (Oaxaca (1973), Blinder (1973)) of the mean dierence in
prots between both works council regimes. However, the Oaxaca-Blinder
decomposition yields inconsistent estimates of the council eect as long as
the self-selection problem is not explicitly addressed.10
Alternatively, the approach by Vella and Verbeek (1999) is suitable and
will be applied in this study. Vella and Verbeek (1999) argue that an en-
dogenous switching regression model can be estimated with a single output
equation containing the regressor of interest and the inverse Mills Ratios
which are interacted with the treatment dummy. The prot equation is then









1   (^ Zi)

+ i (3)
where ^ Zi is the predicted works council probability from equation (2). Eval-
uating the density function () and the cumulative distribution function ()
of the standard normal distribution at ^ Zi gives the inverse Mills Ratios (in
large parentheses).11 In equation (3), 1 is the coecient of the inverse Mills
Ratio for the establishments that have a council. The coecient measures
the covariance between the error in the selection equation (2) and the error
in the prot equation (3). On the other hand, 2 refers to the establishments
that have no council. Both coecients can be used to describe the selectivity
mechanisms.
Although the Heckman Two Step estimator is identied by nonlinear-
ities, valid instruments in the selection equation improve the stability of
the results. The instrument has to be exogenous to the council state but
correlated with it, and it is allowed to inuence prots via works councils,
exclusively. I use the industry share of establishments with a works council
and the within-establishment standard deviation of workers' age { both in-
struments are computed from the sample that is used for regression. While
10 How to correct for self-selection within the framework of an Oaxaca-Blinder decom-
position is described below.
11 For consistency one has to assume that the errors in the selection equation and the
outcome equation follow a bivariate normal distribution.5 Methods 12
the rst instrument is a standard technical instrument, the latter mirrors
work force heterogeneity within establishments. I assume that a homoge-
nous workforce is more likely to successfully organize a council election and
to maintain the council. On the other hand, the dispersion of workers' age
within an establishment is assumed to be uncorrelated with the prot situ-
ation. The hypothesis that the coecients of both instruments are jointly
zero is rejected with 2(2) = 49:96 and a corresponding p-value p = 0:000.
Unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity that is correlated with right-
hand side variables may bias the results regardless of whether it is controlled
for self-selection into the council regime or not. Unobserved heterogeneity
can, for instance, be a dierence in the quality of management or in the
establishments' worker-management relations. In case of continuous depen-
dent variables (here quasi rent per worker) and panel data, a xed eects
estimator can be used to deal with unobserved heterogeneity. A xed eects
within-estimator uses deviations from within-establishment averages to iden-
tify parameters. Hence, time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity is removed
from the error term. As this principle applies to all right-hand side variables,
the eects of (nearly) time-invariant regressors like works council or collective
bargaining cannot be estimated (precisely).
In order to obtain estimates for time-invariant regressors and to control
for potential correlations between time-variant regressors and time-invariant
unobserved heterogeneity, a xed-eects prot regression for all time-varying
regressors is estimated in a rst step. Then the within-establishment average
of the residual from that regression is computed and these average residuals
are used as dependent variables in a second step OLS regression with the
time-invariant regressors.12
In that approach, the rst step equation is
quasiit   quasii = (Xit   Xi) + errorit (4)
where quasiit is the quasi rent of establishment i in year t, errorit is a
zero mean white noise error term, and an upper bar denotes the within-
establishment average. The inuence of W and the inuences of other time-
invariant regressors in X on prots are now part of the establishment-specic
xed eect.13 The establishment-specic xed eect is, in expectation, equal
12 See Black and Lynch (2001) for a very similar approach.
13 As some variables are not fully time-invariant, they would appear in equation (4)
although the basic idea of the applied two step approach is to estimate their coecients in
the second step. Consequently, I exclude the following variables that have no or very small
within-establishment variation from equation (4): works council, bargain, exporter, single,
east, size100, size200, industry aliation, and old. As training, PDImin, and PDImax are
observed only for some panel waves, these variables are also excluded from equation (4).5 Methods 13
to the average establishment-specic residual from equation (4). To obtain
the average residual, rst, the predicted values for the quasi rent are sub-
tracted from the observed values which gives the rst-step residuals
quasiit   ( \ quasiit) = Ci + i + errorit: (5)
where Ci are the regressors that have been excluded from equation (4) and i
is the remaining establishment-specic xed eect. Next, I average the rst-
step residuals over the entire sample period for each establishment to get an
estimate of the establishment-specic time-invariant component of the rst
step residual Ri with Ri = 1
T
P
t quasiit [ \ quasiit]. The second step equation
is then
Ri = Ci + i + ] errori: (6)
This approach generates estimates for the time-invariant regressors while
controlling for potential correlations between unobserved heterogeneity and
time-variant regressors. Nevertheless, an estimation of equation (6) suers
from the same potential self-selection problem that arises if equation (1) is
estimated directly. In order to control for the selectivity, the same proce-
dure as applied to equation (1) can also be applied to equation (6). The
only dierences are that the dependent variable is now the average rst-step
residual Ri instead of the quasi rent, and that Xi is now Ci and contains
only the time-invariant regressors, and that Zi, additionally to Ci, contains
the within-establishment averages of the two instruments described above.
An Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (Oaxaca (1973), Blinder (1973)) re-
veals additional insights. It estimates the share in the total quasi rent dier-
ence between the two groups of establishments with and without a council
that cannot be explained by dierent endowments. In order to estimate this
and to use the advantages of the two step procedure, the Oaxaca-Blinder de-
composition is applied to equation (6), too. Additionally, selectivity is con-
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are computed from equation 2
where Zi consists of Ci and the within-establishment averages of the two
instruments described above. The ^ 1 and ^ 2 are obtained by estimating
14 See Mueller (2009) for a more in depth treatment of this issue.6 Results 14
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
+ 2i if W = 0: (8)
As a result, the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition decomposes the dierence
between the means of the selectivity adjusted average rst-step residuals
(which reect the quasi rent) of the group with a council and the group
without a council. Assuming valid instruments and that 1i, 2i, and the error
of the selection equation are trivariate normally distributed, the selectivity-
adjusted Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition gives a consistent estimate of the
protability eect of works councils. Acknowledging that these assumptions
may not be completely fullled, I will only rely on the estimated sign of the
eect and not on its magnitude.
6 Results
To estimate the eect of works councils on prots and to test the two hy-
potheses derived in Section 3, for each dependent variable four regressions
are reported:
1. a baseline regression without the council{bargaining interaction and
without selectivity control,
2. a regression without the interaction but with control for the endogene-
ity of the council dummy that may arise due to self-selection (tests the
second hypothesis), and
3. two regressions with selectivity controls that are separated by the re-
spective collective bargaining status (tests the rst hypothesis).
6.1 Subjective Prot Measure
The results for the estimations using the self reported measure are presented
in Table 2. Just like, for instance, in Addison et al. (2001), works council
presence is negatively correlated with this prot measure. Surprisingly, the
negative eect is stronger after controlling for selectivity. Also unexpectedly,
works councils have more negative eects on prots in case of collective bar-
gaining. Hence, both hypotheses are rejected with the subjective measure.6 Results 15
The marginal eect of works councils is insignicant though, regardless of
the specication.
According to the coecient of the East/West dummy, East German man-
agers are signicantly more satised with the prot situation of their estab-
lishment than West German managers. Obviously, this does not reect the
actual prot situation of the establishments. My results for the objective
measures in Table 3 and Table 4 show that East German establishments
earn less. The same is true for the establishment size indicators: smaller
establishments are more satised with their prot situation although, ac-
cording to the results in Table 3, their quasi rent per worker is signicantly
lower.
The coecients of the East/West dummy and the establishment size dum-
mies reveal a fundamental problem with this self-reported measure: the re-
searcher does not know the reference point of the respondent. Respondents
may condition their answer, for example, on the general situation of their
establishment, on the situation of their nearby competitors, on last years
prots or on something else that is unknown to the researcher. Hence, an
East German manager may report a good prot situation because the estab-
lishment earns more than other East German establishments and not because
its earnings are really `good' { whatever `good' means. Because of these prob-
lems and the puzzling coecients for the East/West and establishment-size
dummies, and because the results of the selectivity control and the bargain-
ing interaction are not in line with theoretical expectations, I conclude that
the self-reported evaluation of the prot situation is a poor measure for the
establishments' real prot situation.15
6.2 Objective Prot Measures
Table 3 provides regression results for the quasi rent per worker as a measure
of protability. The quasi rent is that part of value added that is earned
by capital owners, i.e. by the rm owners and by outside capital providers.
Assuming the same costs per unit of capital for each establishment, the ceteris
15 Studies that compare subjective and objective measures of rm performance typically
nd a strong positive correlation between both types of measures and conclude that both
are valid indicators for rm performance (see, for instance, Dess and Robinson (1984)
or Wall et al. (2004)). Note that in these studies the survey questions that produce
the subjective measures of rm performance dictate reference points to the respondent {
questions typically ask for performance \in comparison to rms of similar size, region and
industry". Recall that these reference points are not given in the IAB establishment panel
survey. I conjecture that the absence of reference points in the survey question is the main
reason for the poor performance of the subjective prot measure in my study.6 Results 16
paribus eect of works councils on the quasi rent per worker is equal to the
eect on establishment prots.16
The council eect is positive throughout all specications. The eect
is large and, except for column 4, statistically highly signicant. As ex-
pected from theoretical considerations, the council coecient is highest in
the presence of a collective bargaining agreement.17 The selectivity control,
as expected, considerably increases the positive main eect of councils.18
However, because of the well-known weaknesses of all non-experimental in-
strumental variable approaches, the magnitude of the estimates in columns
2 to 4 should not be taken too literally. What can be learned from these
estimates is the unambiguous direction of the selectivity bias.
The results for the binary objective measure are presented in Table 4.
The estimates are generally very imprecise. This may be caused by the small
sample size or noise in the dependent variable. Such noise may come from
tax optimizing behavior of establishments, e.g., from postponing or moving
forward tax burdens as discussed in Section 4. In general, the results resem-
ble those obtained from the quasi rent regressions: the works council eect
increases if endogeneity issues are taken into account19 and works councils
are more positively related to prots in case of collective wage bargaining.
6.3 Unobserved Heterogeneity
In the previous section it is argued that the subjective measure is not appro-
priate because, among other things, answers depend on unknown reference
16 Of course, the shares of borrowed capital and equity in total capital dier across
establishments. One could argue that equity is priced dierently than borrowed capital
and object that the ceteris paribus eect of councils on quasi rent may therefore be a biased
estimate of councils eect on prots as soon as the debt to equity ratio is systematically
dierent for establishments with and without a council. However, the assumption of equal
costs per unit of capital becomes less restrictive if equities are viewed as investments of
rm owners that are priced with a competitive interest rate. In that view, the ceteris
paribus eect of councils (i.e. holding capital xed) measures the inuence of councils on
that part of prots that exceeds the revenues from competitively priced capital. Finally,
assuming competitively priced borrowed capital, the ceteris paribus eect measures the
councils' eect on that part of rm owners' surplus that goes beyond the revenue from
competitively priced capital.
17 This also holds if separate regressions are performed for East and West Germany and
for the subgroups of establishments with no more than 100 employees and with more than
100 employees, respectively.
18 The hypothesis that the coecients of both instruments in the selection equation are
jointly zero is rejected with 2 = 49:96 and p = 0:000.
19 The hypothesis that the coecients of both instruments in the selection equation are
jointly zero is rejected with 2 = 13:91 and p = 0:001.6 Results 17
points. To defend the results obtained by previous studies that used the
subjective measure, one could argue that managers may, for instance, re-
port to not be satised with actually good prots because they, for some
reason, know that their establishment would perform better if there would
be no council. This means that the unknown reference point for managers
in council establishment might be the situation without a council. In that
case, the subjective measure may reect the causal eect of councils while
any objective measure is biased upwards due to unobserved establishment
characteristics that are related to works council existence and lead to higher
productivity.
The following results are obtained after controlling for potential correla-
tions between time-variant regressors and unobserved heterogeneity as de-
scribed in Section 5. The second step results, which are based on equation
(6), are presented in Table 5.20 Supporting the results in Table 3, works
council existence is positively associated with quasi rent per worker through
all specications. However, the eect is now insignicant. Similar to the
results in the previous section, the interaction with collective bargaining is
important, and the selectivity correction slightly increases the eect.
The results of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the unadjusted mean
dierence in the averaged rst step residuals between the group of estab-
lishments with a council and the group of establishments without a council
are presented in Table 6.21 The mean dierence in the residual is approxi-
mately 9,100 Euro per worker in favor of establishments with a council and
approximately 40 percent of that dierence cannot be explained by dierent
endowments. Hence, a quasi rent of approximately 3,800 Euro per worker
can not be explained by the establishments' endowments and is therefore
attributed to council existence.
Conducting the selectivity correction of the mean dierence in the aver-
aged rst step residuals according to the procedure presented in the previous
section leads to the results presented in the lower part of Table 6. I use the
same instruments as before, and, as expected, the dierence in the quasi rents
increases (11,700 Euro). Now the unexplained part of the dierence amounts
to 13,300 Euro per worker. For the same reasons as in the previous section, I
will not rely on the point estimates of the adjusted decomposition but on the
direction of the bias. To sum up, the positive inuence of councils on prots
remains if unobserved heterogeneity and self-selectivity of establishments is
20 Variables that do not appear in the table but appear in Tables 2, 3, and 4 are time-
variant and therefore used in the rst step xed eects regression. As all variables in Table
5 are within-establishment averages, information on product innovation, which is available
only for two waves of the panel, is included without loss of observations.
21 I apply the threefold decomposition following Daymont and Andrisani (1984).7 Summarizing Discussion 18
taken into account.
I conclude that the sign of the council eect on the quasi rent and my
conclusions with respect to the two hypotheses remain unchanged after both
controlling for correlations between unobserved establishment characteristics
and time-varying regressors and, at the same time, correcting for self-selection
into the council regime.
7 Summarizing Discussion
Are the rm owners really worse o with a works council? Are works councils
a rent-seeking and redistributive part of Germany's labor relations legisla-
tion?
Many researcher take the assumptions of Freeman and Lazear's (1995)
works council model and predict that councils may probably increase pro-
ductivity but surely decrease prots. The latter prediction is supported from
the observation of higher wages in council establishments and may also be
inspired by the widespread notion that automatically links employee associ-
ations with rent-seeking behavior. But what if, on average, works councils
surely increase productivity and maybe engage in rent-seeking activities? In
that case, one would expect that councils increase the pie and leave the piece
of the rm owners unaected or even make it larger.
A further look at the Freeman and Lazear (1995) model shows that the
extent of rent-seeking very likely depends on whether distributional conicts
are solved inside or outside the establishment, e.g., at the industry level.
If councils operate in an establishment that is covered by an industry-wide
collective bargaining agreement, their protability eect may be positive be-
cause in that case, wages are (to some extent) exogenous at the establishment
level and councils have little rent-seeking possibilities. Additionally, their
engagement in productivity-enhancing practices is increased (see H ubler and
Jirjahn (2003)).
To shed light on the councils' eect on prots, I estimate regressions for
three dierent prot measures as dependent variables. Further, I account for
the self-selection with respect to works councils, unobserved heterogeneity,
and the interaction with the existence of a collective bargaining agreement.
The rst nding is that the widely used subjective prot evaluation by
the establishments' managers is a poor measure of actual prots and hardly
appropriate as a dependent variable in a prot regression. It yields clearly
implausible results { for example, the estimated eect of being located in East
Germany is positive and signicant { and the changes in results that occur
due to endogeneity corrections and the interaction with collective bargaining7 Summarizing Discussion 19
dier diametrically from changes obtained with objective prot measures.
This casts doubt on the results of previous studies in which this measure
is applied and which are used to show the rent-seeking behavior of works
councils.
Estimations with objective measures yield mainly non-negative coe-
cients for the councils' inuence on prots, which strongly increases if the
establishment is covered by a collective bargaining agreement. As expected
from previous studies (Jirjahn (2009), Kraft and Lang (2008), Mueller (2009)),
the correction for potential self-selection with respect to council existence
further increases the positive council parameter.
The results of this study stand in contrast to the widespread notion ac-
cording to which councils redistribute economic rents from rm owners to
workers. I suggest an explanation for why previous studies found other re-
sults: it is plausible to assume that the subjective prot measure, applied in
previous studies, is a bad measure for actual prots.
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8 Tables
Tab. 2: Dependent variable: managers' evaluation of previous year's prots,
1=good or very good; 0 = otherwise
base- Heckman bargain bargain
Variable Name line Two Step = 1 = 0
Works council -0.022 -0.049 -0.072 0.000
Bargain -0.025 -0.003 -.- -.-
IMR*Works council -.- 0.036 0.038 0.015
IMR*(1-Works council) -.- -0.001 0.030 -0.036
Employees 0.054** 0.082** 0.074 0.088*
Capital Stock 0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004
Tech2 -0.053*** -0.047** -0.082*** -0.011
Tech3 -0.142*** -0.150*** -0.188*** -0.119***
Tech4 -0.167*** -0.214*** -0.193*** -0.295***
Exporter 0.059*** 0.063*** 0.035 0.086**
Single -0.001 0.007 -0.002 0.030
Temporary workers 0.004** 0.003* 0.002 0.006**
Female workers 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.000
Part-time workers 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
Apprentices 0.002 0.001 -0.003 0.005*
Skilled workers 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.000
Churning 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
Training 0.058 0.063 0.046 0.044
East 0.056** 0.083*** 0.098** 0.060
Size100 0.073 0.073 0.062 0.083
Size200 0.028 0.021 0.000 0.042
Old -0.011 0.007 0.049 -0.029
Overtime 0.067*** 0.059*** 0.009 0.120***
Work hours -0.003 -0.006 -0.015 0.008
Observations 6,648 4,735 2,546 2,184
Notes: All results are marginal eects after Probit. Year and sectoral dum-
mies included. *;**;*** denote signicance at the 10 percent, 5 percent or 1
percent level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by establishments.
IMR is the inverse Mills Ratio. Columns 2 { 4 are second step probit re-
gressions (equation (3)) from an endogenous switching regression following
Vella and Verbeek (1999) { column 2 for the pooled sample, columns 3 and
4 separated according to collective bargaining regime.8 Tables 23
Tab. 3: Dependent variable: quasi rent per worker in 1,000 Euro
base- Heckman bargain bargain
Variable Name line Two Step = 1 = 0
Works council 3.2*** 12.4** 22.1*** 3.7
Bargain 2.0** 2.7** -.- -.-
IMR*Works council -.- -6.1** -8.1* -4.5
IMR*(1-Works council) -.- -5.6 -14.2** -0.3
Employees -7.0*** -7.9*** -8.8*** -6.8**
Capital Stock 4.3*** 4.1*** 3.7*** 4.7***
Tech2 -3.0** -3.9*** -2.4 -5.5***
Tech3 -5.6*** -7.7*** -7.4*** -7.6***
Tech4 -12.4*** -17.9*** -18.0*** -18.2***
Exporter 5.2*** 5.8*** 5.2*** 7.0***
Single -7.5*** -5.9*** -8.7*** 0.2
Temporary workers 0.2** 0.1 0.1 0.1
Female workers -0.1*** -0.1* -0.1 -0.1
Part-time workers -0.0 -0.0 0.0 -0.1**
Apprentices -0.2*** -0.2** -0.2 -0.2
Skilled workers 0.0 -0.0 -0.1** 0.0
Churning -0.1*** -0.1** -0.0 -0.0
Training 4.6* -1.4 0.6 -6.1*
East -4.0*** -4.3*** -2.6 -6.3***
Size100 -8.5*** -7.7*** -8.5** -6.4
Size200 -6.1*** -6.8*** -7.6*** -7.1*
Old -2.6** -3.9*** -3.6 -4.4**
Overtime -0.6 -0.5 0.7 -2.1
Work hours -0.4* 0.2 0.6 -0.2
Observations 6,648 4,735 2,548 2,187
Notes: Year and sectoral dummies included. *;**;*** denote signicance at
the 10 percent, 5 percent or 1 percent level, respectively. Robust standard
errors. IMR is the inverse Mills Ratio. Columns 2 { 4 are second step OLS
regressions (equation (3)) from an endogenous switching regression following
Vella and Verbeek (1999) { column 2 for the pooled sample, columns 3 and
4 separated according to collective bargaining regime.8 Tables 24
Tab. 4: Dependent variable: managers report on previous years' prots,
1=positive; 0=negative or balanced
base- Heckman bargain bargain
Variable Name line Two Step = 1 = 0
Works council -0.10*** 0.00 0.26 -0.16
Bargain -0.03 -0.02 -.- -.-
IMR*Works council -.- -0.03 -0.23** 0.12
IMR*(1-Works council) -.- -0.10 -0.21 -0.06
Employees 0.08** 0.06 -0.04 0.12*
Capital Stock 0.01 0.02 -0.00 -0.00
Tech2 -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 -0.04
Tech3 -0.13** -0.13** -0.16*** -0.14
Tech4 0.02 -0.04 -0.21* -.-
Exporter 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.08*
Single -0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00
Temporary workers 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00***
Female workers 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00
Part-time workers 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00
Apprentices 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Skilled workers -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00
Churning -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00
Training 0.02 0.03 -0.07 0.10
East -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06
Size100 0.05 0.05 -0.00 0.10
Size200 -0.08 -0.08 -0.12 -0.01
Old -0.00 -0.02 0.03 -0.09
Overtime 0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.00
Work hours -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.00
Observations 1,037 956 486 449
Notes: All results are marginal eects after Probit. Year and sectoral dum-
mies included. *;**;*** denote signicance at the 10 percent, 5 percent or
1 percent level, respectively. IMR is the inverse Mills Ratio. Columns 2
{ 4 are second step probit regressions (equation (3)) from an endogenous
switching regression following Vella and Verbeek (1999) { column 2 for the
pooled sample, columns 3 and 4 separated according to collective bargaining
regime.8 Tables 25
Tab. 5: Second step results of Two Step Approach, dependent variable: quasi
rent per worker in 1,000 Euro
base- Heckman bargain bargain
Variable Name line Two Step = 1 = 0
Works council 2.9 9.8 11.0 8.0
Bargain 2.3 -0.2 -.- -.-
IMR*Works council -.- -6.5 -6.8 -4.4
IMR*(1-Works council) -.- -0.9 -0.7 -3.3
Exporter 11.8*** 11.1*** 9.0** 15.0***
Single -11.5*** -10.8*** -13.3*** -3.7
Training 8.7* 7.6* 10.0 0.7
East -1.6 -1.8 -2.1 -1.6
Size100 -13.1*** -10.7*** -13.1*** -8.4
Size200 -5.6 -5.6 -7.3 -5.1
Old -1.0 -1.3 -2.9 -0.1
PDImax -4.8** -4.9* -3.6 -5.6*
PDImin 2.4 2.7 3.1 2.6
Observations (= establishments) 1,722 1,703 956 747
Notes: OLS; all variables are within-establishment averages. Year and sec-
toral dummies included. *;**;*** denote signicance at the 10 percent, 5
percent or 1 percent level, respectively. Robust standard errors. IMR is the
inverse Mills Ratio. Columns 2 { 4 are second step OLS regressions (equa-
tion (3) applied to the within establishment average of the residuals from
equation (4)) from an endogenous switching regression following Vella and
Verbeek (1999) { column 2 for the pooled sample, columns 3 and 4 separated
according to collective bargaining regime.8 Tables 26
Tab. 6: Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of second step dierential, dependent
variable: quasi rent per worker (in 1,000 Euro)
Variable (Std.Err.)
Unadjusted Dierential (1,722 Obs.)
Prediction with council 5.9*** (1.4)
Prediction without council -3.2*** (1.0)





Adjusted Dierential (1,703 Obs.)
Prediction with council 2.8** (1.4)
Prediction without council -8.9*** (1.0)





Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *,**,*** denotes signicance
at the 10, 5 or 1 percent level, respectively. Positive numbers for the decom-
position results indicate advantages for the council group. Decomposition
evaluated at the council establishments' endowments.8 Tables 27
Tab. 7: Variable Description
Variable Name Mean Description
Works council 0.471 1 if works council exists
Bargain 0.574 1 if covered by a collective bargaining agree-
ment between employer and union
Employees 4.273 log of the total number of employees
Capital Stock 14.583 log of capital stock value
Tech1 (reference) 0.232 1 if capital stock is state of the art, self-
evaluated relative to competitors
Tech2 0.496 1 if technology of capital stock is one category
worse than Tech1
Tech3 0.249 1 if technology of capital stock is two cate-
gories worse than Tech1
Tech4 0.023 1 if technology of capital stock is three cate-
gories worse than Tech1
Exporter 0.480 1 if the establishment exports
Single 0.723 1 if the establishment does not belong to a
group of aliated companies
Temporary workers 2.03 in percent of total employment
Female workers 33.09 in percent of total employment
Part-time workers 12.80 in percent of total employment
Apprentices 5.43 in percent of total employment
Skilled workers 69.30 in percent of total employment
Churning 5.17 in percent of total employment
Training 0.196 persons participating in employer-provided
training programs, share in total employment
East 0.410 1 if located in Eastern Germany
Size100 0.658 1 if at most 100 employees
Size200 0.239 1 if at most 200 employees but more than 100
Old 0.656 1 if the establishment existed prior to 1990
Overtime 0.636 1 if overtime work exists
Work hours 38.74 regular weekly full-time hours
PDImax 0.612 0 to 2; indicates major product innovations
PDImin 0.128 0 to 2; indicates minor product innovations
Notes: Statistics for 6,648 observations of the regressions in column 1 of
Tables 2 and 3. The capital stock is computed following Mueller (2008).
Skilled workers are craftsmen who have at least two years of formal profes-
sional education, or other employees who perform qualied tasks, i.e. uni-
versity graduates. The churning rate is computed as in Burgess et al. (2000)
and measures personnel uctuations that leave total employment unaected.
Product innovations are asked retrospective for two years in 2001 and 2004
(statistics reported for 1722 observations). The index for PDImax is 2 if the
establishment had major product innovations in both periods, it is 1 if it
had them in one period and zero if there was no major product innovation.
PDImin is coded similarly for minor product innovations.